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SUCCESSFUL EVALUATION OF SINCERITY
AFTER WELSH
This comment will probe the difficulties in determining whether,
and within what limits, a man's personal moral convictions shall be
permitted to override his obligation to defend his country.
The author will initially examine how Welsh v. United States1
encompassed secular views within the "religious training and belief"
clause of the statutory exemption.' The Supreme Court reconciled
the language Congress used in the Selective Service Act' with the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the estab-
lishment clause of the first amendment. By "crowning conscience
king," the Supreme Court has adopted a vague standard that could
open a virtual Pandora's box requiring draft boards to make nearly
impossible choices. In the vast majority of cases after Welsh, sin-
cerity, rather than the requisite substantive belief, will become the
ungovernable decisional touchstone.'
Under the present administrative regulations, the means used to
ascertain the sincerity of each claim is dangerously inadequate.
Without a thorough inquiry by a competent and impartial examiner,
unfairness to both the sincere conscientious objector and his country
invariably result.
To best achieve the objective of assuring enlightened action
which will afford proper safeguards to the affected interests of the
registrant, the author advances a proposal that will require a
thorough and reflective exploration of a conscientious objector's
beliefs by an impartial civilian examiner.
INTRODUCTORY CONSIDERATIONS
Conscientious objectors feel compelled to object in various
degrees to the state's requirements with respect to warmaking and
military policy. There are really two groups of C.O.'s. The first, and'
overwhelmingly the largest, are members of the organized paci-
1 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
2 Military Selective Service Act of 1967, § 6(j), 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 456(j) (1969).
3 Military Selective Service Act of 1967 Pub. L. No. 90-40, 81 Stat. 100 (1967),
50 U.S.C.A. App. § 456 (1969), amending, 50 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 451-73 (1964).
4 "The primary test that must be used is the test of sincerity with which the
belief is held. The board should be convinced by information presented to it that the
registrant's personal history reveals views and actions strong enough to demonstrate
that expediency is not the basis of his claim." LocAL BoARD MFORANDum No. 107,
July 6, 1970.
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fist churches, namely Amish, Quakers, Jehovah Witnesses and
Mennonites. A second and comparatively minute group consists of
individuals whose objections are based on their own moral or ethical
beliefs, rather than the tenets of a particular sect.'
A C.O.'s substantive belief reflects a continuum of consider-
ations: religious, moral, ethical, philosophic, humanist, social and
political. The differences within these beliefs are frequently so small
that it is extremely difficult to tell where one ends and another begins.
Historically, Congress has required "religious training and belief" to
be the objector's prime motivation in conscientiously opposing war.6
Congress has traditionally felt that beliefs emanating from a religious
source are held with a greater intensity. Ethics and morals, while the
concern of secular philosophy, have been taught by organized
religions and, for most individuals, spiritual and ethical nourishment
came from that source. 7 A long standing association of conscience
with religious institutions has been a discreet way of avoiding having
to take the individual at his word. When an objector is a member of
a traditional religion, it is thought to be much easier to ascertain the
strength of his belief by the relationship it bears to the theology as
a whole.
A "nation under God" is willing to accept with tolerance the
fact that some citizens will not, because of their religious beliefs, kill
another human being even in time of war. But the broadening of the
exemption to nonreligious objectors with its resultant increase in
numbers is not as easily accepted. The nonreligious objector opposes
war because he feels, based on his own reasoning and study, that
armed conflicts are useless and wrong. The religious objector is
motivated by teachings which he believes are inspired by God. He
believes that if he violates the tenets of his faith by killing in war, he
will be subjected to eternal punishment.8 Despite this critical differ-
ence in motivation, a gradual legislative and judicial attempt to
5 See REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE SELECTIVE SERVICE
COMMISSION VIII-3 (1968) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE].
6 The Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 78, exempted only those found
to be members of any well organized "religious sect or organization as presently
organized and existing, whose principles forbid participation in war in any form and
who actually subscribed to these principles of the sect or organization." Congress
gradually has been forced to recognize that the belief rather than membership was more
important. Mere formal affiliation is no true measure of intensity of beliefs since many
nominal adherents do not share or pursue the ethics of their church. The 1940 Act
provided that the exemption might be claimed by one "who by reason of religious
training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form."
Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720 § 5(g), 54 Stat. 889.
7 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 350 (1970).
8 Smith and Bell, The Conscientious Objector Program--A Search for Sincerity,
19 U. PITT. L. Rzv. 695, 711 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Smith and Bell].
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enlarge the meaning of conscience beyond the traditional confines of
religion has sought to protect the equally sincere objector.
NONRELIGIOUS OBJECTION IS ENTITLED TO EQUAL STATUS
Section 6(j) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967
provides in pertinent part:
Nothing contained in the title shall be construed to require any person
to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of
the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.9
It is difficult to define religion for the purposes of this single statute
and distinguish it from social, philosophical or moral objections.0
In the absence of a universally acceptable touchstone which would
enable a draft board to make this distinction, it is extremely difficult
to administer a law which attempts to define true religion" without
working hardship or discrimination against those who have the
misfortune to dissent or believe otherwise. The radius of this exemp-
tion is the conscientiousness with which an individual opposes war in
general. If section 6 (j) only accords a preference to the religious, but
disadvantages individuals motivated by teachings of non-theistic
religions guided by an inner ethical voice, groups who legitimately
fall within the natural perimeter of the latter class are unconstitu-
tionally excluded.' 2
To avoid imputing to Congress an unconstitutional intent to
classify different religious beliefs, exempting some and excluding
others, the Supreme Court has come to recognize "all sincere beliefs
which are based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to which
all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately depen-
dent.' 13 In United States v. Seeger, the Warren Court enunciated a
test which included convictions which assumed the role of a tradi-
tional religion and functioned as such in the registrant's life:
...The test of belief in relation to a Supreme Being is whether a
given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life
of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of
one who clearly qualifies for the exemption. 14
Five years later, the Supreme Court made explicit its total
elimination of the statutorily required religious element for the
9 50 U.S.C.A. APP. § 456(j) (1969) [emphasis added].
10 See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 174 (1965).
11 Id. at 174.
12 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 345 (1970).
13 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
14 Id. at 176.
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exemption in Welsh v. United States.5 In reversing Welsh's convic-
tion for refusing to submit to induction into the armed forces, the
majority was obligated to reaffirm and expand Seeger. The Warren
Court had considered Daniel Seeger's views as sufficiently religious
to qualify for the exemption. However, Welsh's views were not even
characterized as religious. The Court noted that "[n]o matter how
pure and admirable Welsh's philosophy of life may be, and no matter
how devotedly he adhered to it, his philosophy and morals and social
policy cannot be said to be religious."' 6
The majority of the Court evidently felt that it was impractical
to attack the religious preferment issue directly for fear of elimi-
nating the C.O. category and removing all possibility of justifiable
exemption. The Court probably would have felt obliged to declare
the statute unconstitutional if it admitted that Congress has passed a
law (as it undoubtedly intended to do) granting exemptions to
young men who go to church while denying exemptions to those who
do not. To avert this inevitable constitutional collision, the Court's
only alternative was to fashion a meaning of the crucial phrase
"religious training and belief" which would embrace the ever
broadening understanding of the contemporary religious community.
In the very narrow context of one statute, "religion" has been
denigrated to the point where it becomes equivalent to a "strongly
held objection." Virtually an indefinite number of value systems or
beliefs, as varied as the individuals who hold them, theoretically
could merit recognition as a "religion." A broad construction of
"religion" was necessary to avoid serious constitutional difficulties, 17
15 398 U.S. 333 (1970). In his original application for conscientious objector
status in April 1964, Welsh stated he did not believe in a Supreme Being but later
advised his board he neither definitely affirmed or denied it. In a special conscientious
objection form SSS 150, he struck out the words "religious training and" and stated
he was opposed to participation in war by reason of his belief. He claimed he had
deep conscientious scruples against taking part in wars where people were killed,
being motivated by a voice so loud and insistent that he preferred to go to jail rather
than serve in the armed forces. Welsh was sentenced to three years imprisonment for
refusing to submit to induction into the armed forces in violation of 50 U.S.C.A. APP.
§ 462(a) (1965) after he had been denied C.O. status.
16 Welsh v. United States 398 U.S. 333, 341 (1970).
17 It does not really matter how the court decided to grant equal recognition to
the nonreligious objector. When the Selective Service Act comes up for consideration
this summer, Congress could respond to Welsh by a precise statement of the law for
administrative purposes. The clause "religious training and belief" could be replaced
with a guideline that on its face expressly encompasses the full range of sources from
which men draw their beliefs on matters of ultimate concern. Such a guideline should
require a sincere and meaningful belief that is a product of profound human conscience.
Such a standard will withstand serious constitutional challenges never answered by the
majority of the Welsh court. It makes little sense to include both religious and non-
religious views within language that states explicitly only "religious training and
belief" would merit statutory protection. It is far easier to reckon with and incorporate
nonreligious beliefs within the suggested guideline.
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but Welsh can not be taken as a definitive statement as to what reli-
gion would mean for all persons and all purposes.
The common denominator for the exemption has become the
intensity of moral conviction with which a belief is held. To determine
the subjective sincerity of each claim will require a delicate and
painstaking examination of the depths of the belief. Expertise is
needed to improve the focus on this issue. Without it, such a nebulous
standard could force local draft boards to make nearly impossible
judgments.18
A HERCULEAN TASK
There are few tasks more difficult than judging the sincerity of
another man's belief. "Human experience has devised no precise
gauge for appraising a subjective belief lodged in the mind and
heart of the person. . "..""I Any external judgment about the most
secret core and sanctuary of another man is a complex and delicate
task. "That this judgment must be largely intuitive and therefore
more or less arbitrary, aided only in part by the science of psychol-
ogy, is regrettable but true."20 Law is therefore concerned with the
acts and conduct of men and only rarely attempts to fathom the
depths of man's conscience. 2'
The subjective nature of the sincerity test militates against the
application of any particular rules.22 Nonetheless, factual determina-
tion of the intrinsic sincerity of each claim is vital. The present test
of sincerity lacks the essential specialized techniques demanded by
the peculiar nature of the claim.
Procedure in Obtaining Exemption
The registrant has the burden of convincing his local board
that he is entitled to the classification requested.2 3 Considering his
youth, experience and lack of competent legal counsel,24 this burden
18 See text accompanying notes 45-63 infra.
19 Blalock v. United States, 247 F.2d 615, 618 (4th Cir. 1957).
20 Morris, Guidelines For Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARv. L. REv. 327, 344 (1969).
21 Stone, The Conscientious Objector, 21 COLIUM. U. QUAR. 253, 258 (1919).
22 Smith and Bell, supra, note 8, at 716.
23 32 C.F.R. § 1623.2 (1971), United States v. Carrol, 398 F.2d 651 (3rd Cir.
1968).
24 THE REFORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'X ON SELECTIVE SERVICE, IN
PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WHO SERVES WHEN NOT ALL SERVE? 29, [hereinafter cited as
MARSHALL REPORT]. The Marshall Commission found that the appeal agents are almost
totally inactive. Clerks freely admit that their appeal agents have checked no files and
have seen no registrants. The advising that is done is by clerks who know only SSS
regulations and very little about case law. The role of the government appeals agent
requires him to have divided loyalty in that he is supposed to advise both the
19711
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is grossly unfair.26 Once a prima facie case has been made, the
Selective Service has the burden of showing something in the record
supporting a denial.
The initial classification form completed by a new registrant
includes a brief statement to be signed by the registrant if he seeks
C.O. classification. After signing this statement, the registrant
receives a special Conscientious Objector Form from the local board.
Otherwise, he will receive it only if he takes the initiative and brings
his claim to the board's attention.26 In this form, the registrant
describes the basis for his claim and the history of the development
of his belief. He is advised to provide external evidence, if any, of his
views, including the testimony of references. On receipt of this form,
the draft board can decide what to do with the man on the basis of
explicit knowledge of his position. Since very few board members
know the registrant personally, the boards almost automatically
refuse to grant the exemption."' The registrant is entitled to a
personal appearance before the board members to explain why he
should not be available for military service.28 Lacking expertise and
with only a minimal basis for judging sincerity, many conscientious
but cautious boards are reluctant to take the initiative in deciding in
favor of C.O.'s.2"
registrant and the board. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1967, at 3, col. 1 (appeal agents
instructed by national headquarters to report men they believe are violating the draft
law to the board members). Furthermore, the report indicated most registrants were
not even informed of their availability.
25 See Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955) and Batterton v. United
States, 260 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1958).
26 The existing classification system starts with the premise that "each registrant
will be considered available for military service until his eligibility for deferment or
exemption . . . is established." (32 C.F.R. § 1622.1(c) (1971).
27 Somebody must make the decision of who is to serve in the armed forces and
who is to contribute in "furtherance of the national interest" in industry, agriculture
and other deferred classifications. Riots after the Civil War Draft convinced Congress
that members of the local community are best qualified to evaluate a registrant's
ability to perform various functions for his country. Presumably, the long association
with a registrant and knowledge of what he has done would personalize his relationship
with the draft board. The registrant would know the members well and they him.
Any problems that arose would be worked out in a spirit of mutual rationality and
friendship. But this is usually not the case since only in rural communities are the
board members familiar with the registrant. Consequently, with little personal
knowledge of the registrant, boards routinely deny C.O. claims on the basis of SSS
150 forms. See MARSHALL REPORT, supra, note 24, at 20.
28 32 C.F.R. § 1624 (1971) outlines the personal appearance procedure. The
Selective Service System depicts the personal appearance as a "group of friends and
neighbors sitting down with a registrant to discuss his problems with him." 1 SELECTIVE
SERVICE SYSTEM: THE CLASSIFICATION PROCESS, 158 (Special Monograph No. 5, 1950).
See text accompanying notes 51-62 infra.
29 Most board members fear that anybody could have written the applicants
C.O. Form 150. Only if the registrant is personally acquainted with the board members
would he have his exemption granted without a personal hearing. Most doubtful cases
are decided in the board's favor-relying on the appeal process to make the difficult
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If a registrant is unsuccessful at this critical juncture, he is
confronted with what some writers appropriately designate as a
"legal obstacle course."'30 The local board need not make a record of
what is said at this personal appearance and the board is not required
to give any explanation for the action it takes.31 The unsuccessful
registrant can appeal to the state and national appeal boards.32 These
administrative review boards make their decisions exclusively on the
written record in the registrant's file.33 Neither the registrant nor any
other person is permitted to appear. The only determinations are:
whether the local board has given adequate consideration to all
relevant facts and regulations; whether sufficient documentation is
in the file to support the classification; whether the registrant has
been granted all of his procedural rights; and finally, whether the
classification appears to be in consonance with existing policy.
34
If no facts or inferences upon which the local board's conclusion
is stated, effective rebuttal is impossible. If the decisions by appeal
boards are made solely on the basis of material in the registrant's
file, those registrants who are not skilled in the use of written English
are at a great disadvantage. Where the sincerity of the claimant is
wrongfully denied, review without rehearing is hardly meaningful. It
is highly improbable that an appeal board with only a cold record
before it could rationally reverse a local board determination without
having an opportunity to observe the C.O.'s demeanor. Too many
times the appeal process is only a "rubber stamp" of local board
decisions. A noted author has described the situation well:
It would be an overstatement to assert that local board classificatory
decisions are in fact conclusive as to registrants' claims for reclassi-
fication. However, it is no exaggeration to suggest that the processing
of registrants-the gross allocation of manpower-is almost exclusively
a product of local board administrative action, with the barest mini-
mum of interference from above.35
Consequently, within the Selective Service System adverse deter-
mination of sincerity is not subject to effective review.
decisions. See Rabin, Do You Believe in the Supreme Being? The Administration of
the Conscientious Objector Exemption, 1967 Wis. L. Rav. 642 at 668, 673.
30 Wilson, The Selective Service System: An Administrative Obstacle Course, 54
CAL,. L. REv. 2123 (1966).
31 A registrant's own record is usually the only report of the hearing. The
registrant is therefore required to concentrate on remembering what occurred as well
as participate in the hearing. This places an unfair burden on him and could limit his
responses to the board.
82 See 32 C.F.R. § 1626 (1971).
33 32 C.F.R. §§ 1626-27 (1971) contain appeal procedures.
34 See Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407, 411-15 (1955).
35 Rabin, A Strange Brand of Selectivity: Administrative Law Perspectives on the




Judicial review is available to a registrant only if he is willing to
risk raising the defective classification as a defense in a subsequent
criminal proceeding. 6 Before access to the courts is allowed, the
unsuccessful claimant must refuse to step forward at the appropriate
moment and demonstrate his refusal to be inducted into the armed
forces."7 This act will usually result in prosecution for refusal of
induction and will provide the registrant with a limited opportunity
to challenge his classification.
But the registrant who takes the calculated risk of refusing to be
inducted in order to obtain judicial review of his classification has
no assurance that his allegation of unfairness will be fully examined
by the courts.8 8 The scope of review is extremely narrow.89 The
federal district courts have been hesitant to sit as "super draft
boards."40 The classification is generally upheld if it is supported by
any "basis in fact."'" If the registrant appeared before his local
board, the classification can be upheld simply by a finding that his
appearance was one of unreliability. Therefore, a court could uphold
the local board's denial of a C.O.'s claim on the basis of insincerity
even when there was no specific evidence inconsistent with the
registrant's claim. If courts are not required to look to the whole
record in these cases, they can scan the record for isolated facts
which support a sometimes reluctant board decision. 2
The troublesome problem of review of the issue of sincerity was
admitted in United States v. Simmons:4
88 Prior to 1967 preinduction review was available only in limited circumstances.
See Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956) ; Schwartz v. Strauss, 206
F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1953); Warren v. Abernathy, 198 F.2d 622 (10th Cir. 1952). In
Oesterich v. Selective Service Local Board No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968), the Supreme
Court held that a registrant who was entitled to a mandatory statutory exemption
could obtain preinduction civil review of a local board order reclassifying him under
the delinquency regulations. In cases where the Government will not concede the error
in classification, such review is unlikely at the present time.
87 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 462(a) (1968).
38 Congress has specifically excluded Selective Service proceedings from the
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 463(b) (1968).
Courts are not required to examine the entire record in reviewing the classification.
89 See Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Fact, 69 HAav. L. REv. 1020 (1956).
40 Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955).
41 "The provision making the decisions of the local boards 'final' means to us that
Congress chose not to give administrative action under this Act the customary scope
of judicial review which obtains under other statutes. It means courts are not to
weigh the evidence to determine whether the classification made by the local boards
was justified. The decisions of the local boards made in conformity with regulations are
final even though they may be erroneous. The question of jurisdiction of the local
board is reached only if there is no basis in fact for the classification which it gave the
registrant. . . ." Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122 (1946).
42 Rabin, Do You Believe in the Supreme Being? The Administration of the
Conscientious Objector Exemption, 1967 Wis. L. Rxv. 642, 668 [hereinafter cited as
Rabin].
48 213 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 397 (1955).
[Vol. I1I
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The C.O.'s claim admits of no exact proof (as other classifications).
Probing a man's conscience is at best, a speculative venture. No one,
not even his closest friends and associates can testify to a certainty as
to what he believes and feels. These, at most, can only express their
opinion as to his sincerity.4
4
The court reluctantly acknowledged that the best evidence of this
question may well be, not the man's written statement or those of
other witnesses, but his credibility and demeanor in an impartial and
fair hearing of his claim. Sincerity or good faith, at issue in every
case, especially after Welsh, can only be judicially determined upon
a new hearing. Such a hearing is beyond what Section 6(j) has
promised or accomplished.
The Local Board Decision
If meaningful administrative and judicial review of sincerity is
restricted, the classification process at the local board level is critical.
The Selective Service System is premised on the theory that all
citizens should bear proportionally the burden of personal risk and
financial sacrifice which society must unwillingly parcel out to its
constituents in time of war.4 Does the draft board that parcels out
these burdens possess the impartiality necessary for fair and equita-
ble treatment of conscientious objectors?
Equity and justice require a judge to disqualify himself from
sitting in judgment on a case in which he has a personal interest.
Fairness is more likely to result if an unbiased arbiter settles
controversies.
The decisions of local boards are not made in a vacuum: they
are influenced by the board members' attitudes toward the task they
are to perform and their capacity for performance."6 By its role in
the Selective Service System, the local board has or can have an
alarming conflict of interest in determining exemptions from the
armed forces since its main function is that of obtaining young men
for our armed forces by meeting specific manpower quotas. The
Southeast Asian conflict and its accompanying high quotas put
pressure on local boards to make available as many young men as
possible. Impartial administration of conscientious objector claims
is somewhat inconsistent with this duty unless the available pool of
young men is much larger than any expectable drain on it.4 7
44 Id. at 904.
45 See Conklin, Conscientious Objector Provisions: A View in the Light oj
Torcaso v. Watkins, 51 Gao. L. J. 252, 256 (1963).
46 Rabin, supra note 42, at 650.
47 See White, Processing Conscientious Objector Claims: A Constitutional Inquiry,
56 CAL. L. REv. 652, 673 (1968).
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The conscientious objector presents an exceptionally unique
problem to his board. Unlike the college student, the C.O. will not
later be available for military service. His alternate civilian service
does not further the national interest as does the defense worker or
scientist. Unlike any other registrant, his infrequent and complex
request for distinctive treatment is uniquely based upon his con-
tempt of the very system that the board member, through his service,
seeks to make an effective enterprise.
When the boards were set up in the days prior to World War II,
Congress decided that they should represent both political parties,
and the board members should be veterans of our previous military
campaigns. If a large majority of the board members had previously
defended our country, they would have an understanding of service
to the nation and a patriotic desire to do their best for their country.4 8
The military service-oriented brand of patriotism still permeates
the decision making process. In data compiled by the Marshall
Commission, 65 percent of local board members were shown to have
served their country in the armed forces. 9 A majority of those who
decide the conscientious objector's fate are veterans of the same
military system the C.O. scorns. There are naturally strong
differences of opinion between the registrant and his "group of
friends and neighbors in the community" who classify him. The
Marshall Commission also reported that an alarming 55 percent of
the local board members in one state believed C.O.'s should not be
deferred at all.50 If claims are denied solely out of personal
convictions, we do not have a rule of law but a rule of men who are
intent on promoting a cause rather than objectively performing a job.
The seemingly unlimited administrative discretion given to
local boards frequently permits this abuse of discretion. The local
board autonomy in the present decentralized structure accentuates
the lack of uniformity in policy and application, concealing the
inconsistent and inequitable treatment of C.O.'s with similar beliefs.
The informality that permeates the adjudication of conscience has
bred a frustrating confusion which eliminates any elements of
predictability. Since many provisions of the regulations are written
in general language and are permissive rather than mandatory, they
are easily misunderstood or misinterpreted. The lack of clarity in the
regulations and the variations in amount and type of guidance
provided are a reflection of the deficiencies of the entire process.51
48 1 SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEMS: Organization and Administration of the Sys-
tem, 191 (1951).
49 MARSHALL REPORT, supra, note 24, Table 1.3 at 74.
50 Id. at 29.
51 See TASK FORCE, supra, note 5, at IV-I.
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DIFFICULTIES WITH THE TEST OF SINCERITY
The overwhelming majority of local draft boards are manned
by uncompensated individuals who are themselves highly conscien-
tious and can usually draw on what they have learned from years of
experience to make most classifications. Yet the ability to peer into a
man's conscience and unerringly read what is found there, is not
something that can necessarily be acquired with the mere passage of
time. Since man's conscience springs from some internal source of
self-knowledge, it acknowledges no superior, bows to no authority
and is governed by no law. No iron chain or outward force of any
kind could ever compel the conscience of man to believe or disbelieve.
The local boards are forced to look into a conscience, which by its
definition, ignores reason, defies argument, and is unaccountable and
unresponsive to any human test or standard.
The only significant determination of sincerity is at the personal
appearance of the registrant. With no right to counsel or even to
present evidence of his own, a nervous young man bears the burden
of proving he is entitled to his classification. 2 At this once in a
lifetime moment, he will be compelled to answer antagonistic and
confusing interrogatories. 3 His answers can lead him into alternative
civilian service,54 flight to foreign soil 5 or even battle itself." Even
52 See text accompanying notes 28-34, supra.
53 The HANDBOOK FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS, 10th ed., 46, suggests that
sample questions asked by boards are:
1) What happens to people like you in Russia or China?
2) Do you object to killing or to being killed?
3) Aren't there a lot of Communists mixed up in so-called peace demonstrations?
4) Why accept the benefits of a country you won't protect?
5) If everyone held your view wouldn't Communists take over the country?
6) Why do most of the members of your church oppose the war?
7) Where in the Bible do you find anything that forbids you to help defend your
country ?
8)If God told you to defend your country, what would you do?
54 Registrants classified 1-0 will be ordered to report for civilian work in the
same call-up order as provided for 1-A and 1-A-O men. He can work for a govern-
ment agency or a*nonprofit organization, association or corporation which is primarily
engaged either in a charitable activity conducted for the benefit of the general public
or in carrying out a program for the improvement of the public health or welfare.
It is unfortunately not always possible to find the type of work most suitable to the
skills, experience, interest and vocational goals of all 1-0 registrants.
55 Individuals conscientiously unable to serve in the armed forces but who find
prison completely unacceptable are caught in a dilemma which almost 20,000 have
resolved by leaving the country. Emigration does not relieve one from his liability under
Selective Service and one may face the prospect of prosecution upon his return to the
United States. See C.O. HANDBOOK, supra, note 53, at 56. For an excellent discussion of
the alternatives facing a registrant who must make this decision, See A. GINGER, Thz
NEw DRAFT LAw 235:9 (1967).
56 Since only one out of six soldiers ever do actual front line fighting, this
alternative is encountered infrequently. Occasionally, however, a non-combatant
(1-A-O) who is serving his unit as a medical corpsman will face a life or death
1971]
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though liberal parole into the military is available,517 many young men
will accept prison rather than compromise their beliefs. In these
"schools of crime," his antiwar ideas will not be "rehabilitated" but
more likely will be shared with other "students" in a large graduate
school of revolution.58 It is a sad spectacle if one determined to be
insincere by his board must spend a substantial term in jail
demonstrating his sincerity.59
Studies have shown that appearances before a local draft board
generally are no more than a mere ten minute harassment session."0
On occasions, registrants have been subjected to severe verbal abuse
and have been denounced as being less than patriotic. One registrant
was alledgedly told he "never had done anything for his country and
[was] now engaged in the greatest act of disloyalty to his country.""1
Other extensive studies concerning the superficial and tenuous
nature of the judgment indicate that the factual issue is not one
particularly suited for local board determination: "Many boards do
not understand the problems involved, have not studied the law, are
angry and intolerant or simply lack the necessary mental or moral
equipment for such a delicate task." 2 Local board members them-
selves have doubted their aptitude and proficiency to judge the
sincerity of an individual in ten to fifteen minutes. In response to a
questionnaire asking the boards to rank the difficulty of each classi-
fication, the conscientious objector proved the most troublesome.68
The calls for rectification of this outrage upon fairness have
been steady and persistent. But in the heat of war and its strife, far
reaching changes are less apt to be made. A wide diversity of opinion
exists in this sensitive area, limiting any legislation that must
intimately touch the lives and deepest emotions of so many people.
situation. He is asked to kill or lose his own life. If he does kill, can he still be
characterized as a conscientious objector? The draft board that puts him in this
position has its decision quickly "reviewed."
57 The convicted registrant might be offered the option of being inducted into
the armed forces rather than going to jail. See Comment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1014,
1018 (1966).
58 President Nixon has called U.S. prisons "universities of crime." U.S. Prisons,
Schools For Crime, Tx, Jan. 18, 1971 at 48. This author's experience with correc-
tional facilities bear out this claim. Many an innocent offender would leave prison
wiser in the ways of the recidivist.
59 Those who are not conscientiously opposed to killing in war can accept a
parole into the military rather than be jailed. Only the sincere C.O. will spend time in
jail refusing to compromise his beliefs.
60 Wilson, The Selective Service System: An Administrative Obstacle Course, 54
CAL. L. REv. 2133 (1966) and Rabin, Do You Believe In A Supreme Being-The
Administration of the Conscientious Objector Exemption, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 642.
61 Rabin, supra note 42, at 665.
62 J. CORNELL, THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR AND THE LAW 23 (1943).
68 MARsHALL REPORT, supra note 24, Table 7,4, 182.
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When the Selective Service Act of 1967 expires this summer,
Congress should be urged to consider more effective means to
evaluate the subjective sincerity of each claim. To afford proper
safeguards to the affected interests of the registrant, the dangerously
inadequate method of the present should be overhauled.
PROPOSAL
The difficulty of obtaining meaningful judicial review of
sincerity64 makes it imperative that the administrative procedures of
the local board be scrupulously fair to the conscientious objector.
The sincere C.O., especially the nonreligious objector,65 is not
afforded adequate protection under existing statutory law and pro-
cedure.
The experience of psychologists has shown that the most precise
determination of veracity results from a deliberate inquiry by a com-
petent and impartial examiner."' Speed, not efficiency, characterizes
present board operations. 67 Assistance is urgently needed to assist
those who lack the mental or moral equipment for such a delicate
task.68
To improve and hopefully alleviate the unfair and inconsistent
application of the exemption, the Selective Service Act should be
amended to require a thorough and reflective exploration of a
conscientious objector's beliefs by an impartial civilian examiner.
Accompanied by an attorney or personal advisor,6 9 each appli-
64 See Notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
65 Where an objector is a member of a traditional religion, it is much easier to
ascertain the strength of his belief by the relationship it bears to the theology as a
whole. But a nonreligious objection does not lend itself to such a fairly clear-cut
determination and therefore is likely to end up in the courts with only a "basis in
fact" required to sustain the classification. See TAsK FORCE, supra, note 5, at VIII-3.
66 Conversation with Dr. Roland Lowe, Chairman of the Psychology Department,
University of Santa Clara.
67 Former Selective Service Director General Hershey suggested that conscientious
objectors "are handled best if no one hears from them." See MURRAY, CONSCENCE
AND THE JUST WAR (1970).
68 See Note 61, supra, and accompanying text.
69 Under present law, an applicant for C.O. status is not permitted the assistance
of counsel in his personal appearance. Authorities feel that since this is not a criminal
prosecution and is informal in nature, an articulate advocate might confuse and befog
the layman on the board with legal "jargon." See generally MARSHALL REPORT 1-29.
This denial of counsel was tolerated supposedly because of the non-adversary nature
of the hearing. This danger would be non-existent if the attorney's representation was
before a highly trained and specialized examiner (see Impartial Examiner, infra). If
a lawyer could be used at this stage of the classification process, the unfairness to the
inarticulate (usually poor and uneducated) registrant would be lessened. If a




cant for C.O. status would be required to personally appear and
explain his beliefs in an informal hearing before the detached
examiners, who would then make a recommendation to the local
board. The purpose of the hearing would not be to judge whether the
applicant is correct in his personal assessment of the political, mili-
tary or moral values of warfare, but merely whether his beliefs are
unimpeachably authentic.7° The young man will be tested for the
sincerity and clarity of his convictions within the reasonable limits
set by the intellectual and spiritual maturity which may be properly
expected of a young man his age. A more effective hearing should
indicate less concern about the nature of the belief than its external
manifestation. 71
Each examiner will be required to analyze the registrant's claim
and provide a written recommendation to the local board. 72 If the
local board decided not to follow the recommendations, it would be
required to provide a written explanation specifically enumerating
why the local board thought it best to override the recommendation.
An Impartial Examiner
There are two attractive alternatives, either of which will insure
that specialized assistance will be available to the local board. The
civilian examiner could take the form of either a panel or a single
hearing officer.
The first and most attractive alternative is a civilian panel. 73
All members of this panel would be selected for good judgment and
a sympathetic attitude toward the manifold problems of people as
well as for their administrative ability. The membership of the panel
might include an attorney, a psychologist and a high school teacher
or counselor. 74 These accomplished specialists are endowed with a
70 It is rather extraordinary that a registrant can not have his beliefs rejected
even if they are incomprehensible. No matter how queer, incomprehensible or illogical
one man's beliefs might be, the establishment clause of the first amendment would not
permit recognition of one without equal status for all others. See United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
71 Men may believe what they cannot prove. A registrant should not be put to
the proof of his religion or beliefs. The hearing must decide whether the beliefs
professed by the registrant are sincerely held and whether they govern his actions both
in word and deed.
72 See text accompanying notes 81-82 infra.
73 The Selective Service Youth Advisory Committee recommended a similar panel
above Local Board level to hear conscientious objector cases. See DIALOGUE . . .
ACTION . . . CHANGE . . . RPORT OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE 9 (1970).
74 There are three issues generally demanding attention in a C.O. hearing: the
sincerity of the claim, the legal implications of the claim, and finally, the capacity to
"tune in" to these issues. Each member of the panel is a specialist in these areas.
The religious and nonreligious aspects of the claim suggest the inclusion of a
theologian on this panel. Versed in the contemporary religious expressions of our time,
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versatility to enable them to more accurately ascertain the sincerity
of a conscientious objector.
The advantages of having an attorney sit on this panel are
many. Most notably, he would bring a legal background to the
difficult task of interpreting the legal implications of documents of
the length and complexity of Form 150 applications.75 He is
qualified to interpret and implement case law which will seem
confusing to the ordinary layman. His presence will also deter a
registrant's attorney from confusing the panel with legal terms and
maneuvers.
Psychologists are best qualified to make the personal appraisal
of the registrant's reactions, responses and demeanor on the critical
sincerity issue. Even though a large number of people have a tremen-
dous insight into the psychological intricacies of people with whom
they live, a psychologist is specifically trained to make this analysis.
His professional expertise on this one issue-narrowing inquiry will
be an incredibly precious advancement over layman guesses.76
Accustomed to dealing with this particular age group in similar
situations, experienced counselors and high school teachers have
become sophisticated and skillful in discussing and analyzing their
problems. Possibly the younger the age of this panel member the
better equipped he would be to "tune in" to what the young man is
saying.
The civilian examiner could take another form which also could
effectively evaluate the merits of the conscientious objector's
claim. A single examiner, preferably an attorney, could assist the
board in the same manner as the panel. He could conduct a more
personalized and informal de novo hearing in much the same manner
as the old Department of Justice Hearing Officers.77 He would make
his recommendation directly78 to the local board from the evidence he
gathered in probing the depth and sincerity of a registrant's beliefs.
a theologian's presence and influence could enhance the probability that an equally
sincere objector would not be barred by the incomprehensible nature of his motiva-
tion. Experience with the ethical and moral characteristics of expression could permit
a more careful examination of uncommon beliefs. But an objector's substantive be-
liefs should never be in issue after Welsh. A theologian may weli be prevented by the
establishment clause from being on such a panel. He is the one member who is likely
to be prejudiced against non-traditional beliefs. The inclusion of a theologian on this
panel would create more problems than it could solve.
75 See A. GINGER, THE NEW DRAFT LAW, 235:54 (1967).
76 Psychological testing could enable a more accurate understanding of the appli-
cant.
77 See 32 C.F.R. § 1626.25 (1967); SELECTIVE TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF
1940 ch. 720 § 10.54 Stat. 885 and the UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE
ACT OF 1948 ch. 62, 62 Stat. 604.
78 The Hearing Officers interviewed the registrant and sent a report of the
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An attorney's experience in dealing with clients and witnesses
has given him a "sixth sense" to determine when fabrication distorts
an authentic version of the facts. A draft board lacking the mental or
moral equipment to make an impartial decision urgently needs his
assistance.
Although lacking the varied specialized professional experience,
this second form of civilian examiner has advantages of immeasurable
consequence. A more personalized appraisal of the registrant is
available. It will contain all of the advantages gained prior to 1967
by the Department of Justice hearings while eliminating the
structural deficiencies that doomed that earlier version. 79
The number of panels or hearing officers would vary proportion-
ally to the number of C.O. applications rather than the number of
draft boards. It is of utmost importance to insure that there is a
sufficient number of examiners to eliminate any possible procedural
delay. By minimizing the uncertainty in waiting and discouraging
strategic delays, a conscientious objector classification could be
determined within the same time that is taken with other deferments.
The panel or hearing officer would be required to provide in
writing an analysis of the validity of the registrant's claim. This rec-
ommendation would be directed to the local draft board to assist them
solely in the area of conscientious objection. The recommendation
would not be binding, but if the board decided not to follow the
opinions of qualified experts, the local board would then be required
to provide a written explanation why it decided to override the
recommendation. A written justification for a disputed classification
could function as a precise legal reference point that would permit
more meaningful administrative and judicial review.
Presently, local boards usually provide no reasons for denial of
requested classifications. If reasons are given, they generally are
terse one or two sentence conclusions. National Headquarters
discourages a written opinion because of the considerable administra-
tive difficulty it would entail. Furthermore, it was feared that local
board members, not erudite and seldom lawyers, might give improper
reasons for the classification which would result in reversal in the
courts.
These well-grounded fears would not exist under the proposed
hearing to the Department of Justice. His recommendations were not always followed
and this referral process took a great deal of time. This proposal eliminates that
problem by having the examiner assist the local board directly. See text accompanying
notes 85-86, infra.
79 See text accompanying notes 83-85, infra.
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improvements. Under either proposal, highly qualified specialists
would draft the record to assist the board and courts. The basic
procedural fairness of a writing would not burden the administration
of the board unless they sought to override opinions made as a result
of competent and deliberate inquiries.
Other Classifications Are Aided by Similar Guidance
Every structural level of the Selective Service System is con-
stantly the recipient of information and advice to assist this agency
in the classification of registrants. The Department of Labor and
Commerce provide lists of critical occupations and essential activ-
ities that should be deferred. The Department of Health assists in
the selection of doctors, dentists and other allied specialists. The
Welfare Department furnishes data to enable consistent classification
of hardship cases. The Education and Agriculture Departments
establish criteria for student and agricultural deferments. Each
board has at least one doctor who reviews and advises the board
regarding the physical condition of the registrants. The best quali-
fied segments of our national matrix enlighten and guide the boards
in their respective areas.80 Similar guidance is long overdue in
classifying conscientious objectors, a classification the draft boards
themselves rank as their most difficult.81
Improvement Upon Department of Justice Hearings
The proposed "civilian examiner" structure stresses the equity
and utility gained by the Department of Justice Hearings. Until the
system was abandoned, a conscientious objector received a measure
of protection from the requirement that the Department of Justice
investigate and complete an impartial dossier on the registrant.
Under this system, examination of the registrant's sincerity by an
impartial examiner not connected in any way with the local board
provided a much deeper and more meaningful review than the local
board. 2
Prior to 1967, following almost automatic refusal of his claim
on the basis of his Form 150, the registrant had a right to appear
personally before the local board to convince the members of his
sincerity. If the local board was not persuaded to grant him the
classification, he had 30 days to appeal to the State Appeals Board.
At this point, his entire file was referred to the local United
80 See TASK FORCE, supra, note 5, at V-7.
81 See MARSHALL REPORT, supra, note 24 table 7.4, 182.
82 See SELECTIVE TRAiNNO AND SERVICE ACT OF 1940 ch. 720 § 10, 54 Stat. 885,
and the UNxvrRSAL MiLTARY TaNxno AND SERvIcE ACT oF 1948 ch. 62.62 Stat. 604.
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States Attorney who, after checking it for procedural correctness,
forwarded it to the local office of the F.B.I. for an investigation of the
basis for, and sincerity of the registrant's beliefs. The local office of
the F.B.I. conducted the investigation and rendered its report to both
the United States Attorney and the Washington Headquarters of the
F.B.I.
When a r~sum6 of the file was completed in the Justice Depart-
ment, it was forwarded to the United States Attorney. The r~sum.
and the F.B.I. report was then referred to the local hearing officers.
The hearing officer sent the registrant a notice of the time and place
for a hearing along with a copy of the r~sum6 and instructions re-
garding his rights.
At the appointed time, an informal nonadversary hearing was
held in which the Hearing Officer probed the depths of a registrant's
beliefs. A report of the evidence adduced and the hearing officers'
recommendations were then submitted with the registrant's entire
file to the Conscientious Objector Section in the Department of
Justice. An attorney then drafted a recommendation that was trans-
mitted to the appeal board. If the registrant did not respond to the
classification within 30 days, the appeal board classified him.3
The major benefit of this hearing was that it provided a de novo
hearing of the claim before an impartial examiner not connected in
any way with the local boards. A disappointed registrant was given
an opportunity to appeal to a representative of the national govern-
ment from a decision made by a local board which might be expected
to be less than wholly sympathetic with or understanding of his
claim.
The most unfortunate change in the Selective Service Act of
1967 was complete elimination of the Department of Justice Hearing
Officers.84 The elimination of the vital protection for those claiming
exemption from military service was very untimely.
A thorough investigation consumed an inordinate amount of
time. Hearing officers displayed varying degrees of interest. Some
handled their cases expeditiously while others were indifferent or
simply too busy. The longest procedural drag occurred in the Justice
Department where available personnel simply were not able to
process the avalanche of r~sum~s awaiting recommendations to
local boards. 5 It was very difficult to accurately draft numerous
83 See TASK FORCE, supra, note 5, at VIII-2.
84 50 U.S.C.A. APP. § 456(j) (1968), amending 50 U.S.C.A. APP. § 456(j) (1964).
85 See TASK FORCE, supra, note 5, at VIII-2.
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recommendations on a cold record. During congressional hearings
on the subject, the Attorney General admitted that it had taken up to
twenty-seven months to process some claims although the average
time was only seven months.8 6
Such a procedural drag offered a delaying tactic for registrants
wishing to postpone induction as well as placing an undue hardship
on the sincere C.O. The delays made it possible to forego a military
obligation simply by filing a C.O. claim. The excessive and unwar-
ranted delays at various stages in the process impaired the deterrent
affect of the law for the insincere because he could delay the
"moment of truth."
Congress felt that the administration of the C.O. exemption was
too cumbersome and complex. The courts were taking too much time
to convict and sentence draft "criminals." Congress also had a strong
distrust for the Justice Department. Most of the hearing officers
picked by the Attorney General were prosecutors rather than fact
finders. The inconsistency in having the same agency investigate the
registrant's background, make recommendations to the local board
and perhaps subsequently prosecute him was alarming.
Either alternative proposed in this comment would incorporate
the commendable features of the old hearing officers scheme. If the
civilian examiner will directly assist the local board, the red tape and
excessive and unwarranted delays that characterized the Justice
Department Hearings would be minimized. The most precise test of
sincerity possible under the circumstances will be made with
specialized assistance. The civilian examiner will perform his valu-
able function unburdened by manpower quotas and the Department
of Justice pressure. The recommendation received by the draft
board will be written by the man who personally observed the
claimant.
CONCLUSION
Surely the proposed civilian examiner will not be a cure-all
because conscientious objection involves too many intrinsic pecu-
liarities which can never be completely known. As a nation, we need
the resolve to reach out for an imaginative and innovative solution to
these difficulties that now seem beyond our capacity. We must have
the foresight to consider the C.O. exemption in light of today's
realities rather than yesterday's traditions. The civilian examiner
could play a critical role in a politically sensitive area as an interme-
86 90 CoNG. RiEc. 14273 (1967) (remarks of Senator Rivers).
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diary between the individual who makes a moral claim for the
rightness of his conduct and the state; both to protect the individual
and to satisfy society's concern that such matters be treated with all
possible dignity and fairness.
Robert H. Mott
